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coupled with the boy's love for his own father and his father's
mother-show a case which as a matter of law entitled him
to have his
determined on its merits. It could only
be determined on its merits by finding whether his interests
would best be served
the appointment of the guardian
whom he sought. If the
in this respect were favorable, and his nominee was a fit and proper person (as was
found), then he was entitled to an order granting his petition.
The mere conclusional finding
because the boy had a
place in the home of his mother and stepfather it was not
"necessary or convenient" to appoint a guardian for him)
upon which the trial court and the majority here dispose of
this case, begs the real issue. In fact, disposition of this case
on that ground denies to Richard his day in court on the
real issue.
For further and adequate discussion of this case reference
is made to, and I adopt, the decision prepared for the District
Court of Appeal by Justice Goodell and concurred in by
Presiding Justice Nourse, reported at 254 P.2d 960.
The jndgment should be reversed and the case tried on
its merits.

[S. F. No. 18788.

In Bank.

Nov. 6, 1953.]

HENRY FORD McCRACKEN, Appellant, v. H. 0. TEETS,
as Warden, etc., Respondent.
[1] Criminal Law- Judgment- Execution of Death Sentence-

Sanity Investigation.-Under Pen. Code, § 3701, requiring
prison warden to call district attorney's attention to fact that
there is good reason to believe that defendant under sentence
of death has become insane so that a sanity hearing may be
initiated, warden's duty depends not on fact of insanity but
on whether there is good reason to believe that defendant
has become insane.
[2] Trial-Findings-Conclusiveness.-Finding of court cannot be
impugned by antecedent erroneous expression of trial judge.
§ 501; Am.Jur., Criminal Law,
[1] See Cal.Jur., Criminal
§ 485.
[2] See Cal.Jur., Trial, §§ 174, 232; Am.Jur., Trial, §§ 1145, 1147
et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 4] Criminal Law, § 1043; [2] Trial,
§380; [3] Mandamus, §105; [5, 6] Mandamus, §112(4); [7]
Appeal and Error,§ 1230; [8] Mandamus,§ 112(5).
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[Sa, 3b] Mandamus-Findings.-In mandamus proceeding to compel warden of state prison to institute proceedings for inquiry
into sanity of a prisoner confined under sentence of death, a
finding that warden, under the circumstances shown and presumably acting in accord with facts and law, had no reason
to believe that prisoner was insane is equivalent to or implies
a finding that there was in fact no good reason to believe that
petitioner was other than sane.
[ 4] Criminal Law- Judgment- Execution of Death Sentence-Sanity Investigation.-In view of Pen. Code, § 3701, it is for
warden of state prison initially to determine, in exercise of his
sound discretion, whether there is good reason to believe that
defendant under death sentence has become insane, and in
absence of showing to contrary it must be presumed that
warden regularly performed his duty. (See Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1963, pars. 15, 33.)
[5] Mandamus-AppeaL-To prevail on appeal from judgment
denying petition for mandate to compel warden of state prison
to institute proceedings for inquiry into sanity of a prisoner
confined under sentence of death, petitioner would have to
show that there is no substantial evidence to support determination of question adverse to him, and that evidence impels a finding that there was good reason to believe that he
was insane.
[6] Id.-Appeal.-On appeal from judgment denying petition for
mandate to compel warden of state prison to institute proceedings for inquiry into sanity of a prisoner confined under
sentence of death, reviewing court will not consider additional
evidence relating to petitioner's mental condition since rendition of superior court judgment, where such evidence, if
formally produced, would be, as was evidence before trial
court, in conflict.
[7] Appeal-Taking Additional Evidence.-It was not intended by
enactment of Code Civ. Proc., § 956a, authorizing the taking
of additional evidence on appeal, that reviewing courts should
develop generally into trial courts.
[8] Mandamus-Appeal.-Where record on appeal from judgment
denying petition for mandate to compel warden of state prison
to institute proceedings for inquiry into sanity of a prisoner
confined under sentence of death indicates an erroneous view
by trial judge of warden's duty in the premises and does not
contain a finding expressly resolving controlling issue whether
there was good reason to believe that petitioner had become
insane, a motion to dismiss the appeal will be denied, but
where reviewing court, on consideration of cause on its merits,
is satisfied that petitioner has not been prejudiced by errors
noted, the judgment appealed from will be affirmed.
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APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Marin
County. N. Charles Brusatori, Judge pro tern.* Affirmed.
Motion to dismiss appeal denied.
Proceeding in mandamus to compel warden of state prison
to institute proceedings for inquiry into sanity of prisoner
confined under sentence of death. Judgment denying writ,
affirmed.
George H. Chula and James C. Monroe for Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and Clarence A. Linn,
Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
SCHAUER, J.-Petitioner is confined under a judgment
which imposes the death sentence for first degree murder.
He has appealed from a judgment which denies his petition
for mandate to compel the warden of San Quentin to institute
proceedings for an inquiry into his sanity, and the attorney
general has moved in the alternative to dismiss the appeal
as frivolous on its face (see People v. Shorts (1948), 32 Cal.
2d 502, 506, 516, 518 [197 P.2d 330]; Williams v. Duffy
(1948), 32 Cal.2d 578, 583 [197 P.2d 341]; People v. Adamson (1949), 34 Cal.2d 320, 338 [210 P.2d 13]) or, on like
grounds, to affirm the judgment denying mandate. We have
determined, under all the circumstances of this case, to deny
the motion to dismiss the appeal and to consider the cause on
its merits. Upon such consideration it appears that the judgment must be affirmed.
After the judgment of conviction was affirmed (People v.
McCmcken (1952), 39 Cal.2d 336 [246 P.2d 913]) and a date
for execution of sentence was set, the superior court stayed
execution to permit a hearing of the petition for mandate.
Petitioner relied upon the statutory rule which peremptorily
forbids execution of a person while he is insane (Pen. Code,
§ 1367) and the implementing rule that "If, after his delivery
to the warden for execution, there is good reason to believe
that a defendant, under judgment of death, has become insane,
the warden must call such fact to the attention of the district
attorney . . . , " and the latter official "must" initiate proceedings which lead to a jury hearing on the issue of insanity (Pen. Code, § 3701; italics added).
As is hereinafter explained, the situation is materially
*Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council.
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similar to that in W'illiams v. Duffy ( 1948), supra, 32 Cal.2d
578, although the appeal here appears to have been taken
in the sincere belief by counsel that, because of uncertainty
as to procedural law, it was necessary to protect petitioner's
rights, and was not instituted or carried on as part of a mere
calculated campaign for delay. The evidence before the trial
court, as petitioner concedes, was in substantial confiict. 1 At
the close of evidence the trial judge (apparently being of the
mistaken belief that the law placed upon the warden the
responsibility of determining the fact of sanity), stated, "the
law throws upon the Warden . . . the decision as to whether
in his opinion-not yours, not mine, not the other fellow'sin his opinion whether the man has become insane after he
has been received at the institution on a judgment of death.
. . . I believe this Court has to determine now whether or
not there has been an abuse of discretion by the Warden.''
(Italics added.) Thereafter the court found that the warden
"has no reason to believe that petitioner is other than sane" ;
that petitioner "knows the crime for the commission of which
he has been convicted and the punishment which he is about
to suffer"; and that petitioner is sane.
[1] As was pointed out in Williams v. Duffy (1948), S1tpra,
page 579 of 32 Cal.2d, "the warden's duty, as prescribed by
. . . section [3701], depends not on the fact of insanity, but
on the fact as to whether 'there is good reason to believe that
a defendant . . . has become insane.' " (See, also, Phyle v.
Dnffy (1948), 334 U.S. 431, 443 [68 S.Ct. 1131, 92 L.Ed.
1494].) It is urged that the above quoted statements of the
trial judge show that he ''was mistaken as to the extent of
his review or the issue before him at that mandamus hearing,''
and that the findings do not determine the controlling question: Was there "good reason to believe" that petitioner,
after judgment, had become insane~ [2] The findings can'Such evidence was as follows: The court observed petitioner, who
was present at the hearing but either unable or unwilling to answer
questions, except that he shook his head indicating negative response to
his counsel's question, "Do you know where you are?" Petitioner's
counsel and a psychiatrist testified that in their opinions petitioner was
insane. The warden testified that in his opinion, based on his own
observation and on information which he had received from prison
psychiatrists and physicians, petitioner was sane. The chief medical
officer and the chief psychiatrist of San Quentin testified that in theh
opinions petitioner was sane. In evidence, without objection of petitioner,
were rep01'ts of prison psychiatrists and the prison's chief medical officer;
the reports state the results of examinations of petitioner made from
time to time after the date of his execution had been fixed and the
conclusions that petitioner was sane.
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not be impugned by the antecedent erroneous expression of
the trial judge. (Strttdthoff v. Yates ( 1946), 28 Cal.2d 602,
615-616 [170 P.2d 873]; Southern Cal. Jockey Club v. California etc. Racing Board (1950), 36 Cal.2d 167, 174 [223
P.2d 1].) It is true that there is not, as there should be, a
finding expressly determining the controlling issue. [3a] However, as is hereinafter explained, the finding that the warden
"has no reason to believe that petitioner is other than sane"
must, in the light of the other circumstances here shown, be
held to be the substantial equivalent of a finding that there was
not in fact ''good reason to believe'' that petitioner had become insane.
[4] As appears from the statute (Pen. Code, § 3701) and
the holding of this court in Williams v. D1tjjy ( 1948), supra,
page 580 of 32 Cal.2d, it is for the warden initially to determine, in the exercise of his sound discretion, whether there
is ''good reason to believe'' that a defendant has become
insane. In the absence of a showing to the contrary we must
presume that the warden regularly performed his duty. (See
Code Civ. Pro c., § 1963, pars. 15, 33.) There is no contention
that the warden absented himself from the prison or refused
to take cognizance of pertinent evidence available to him, or
that the finding that the warden "has no reason to believe
that petitioner is other than sane'' is in any way related to
an absence from duty or refusal to consider available evidence. [3b] Therefore, such finding (that the warden, presumably acting in accord with the facts and law, had no reason
to believe that petitioner was insane) implies a finding that
there was in fact no good reason to believe otherwise. (See
Reiniger v. Hassell (1932), 216 Cal. 209, 211 [13 P.2d 737].)
Here, as in the Williams ease, supra, the evidence which
relates to the controlli11g question whether there was "good
reason to believe" that petitioner had become insane, including the testimony of experts, is in conflict. [5] In order
to prevail on appeal from the judgment based on such evidence, and the necessarily implied finding against him on such
question, petitioner would have to show that there is no
substantial evidence to support the determination of the question adverse to him, and that the evidence impels a finding
that there was good reason to believe that he was insane
(p. 581 of 32 Cal.2d.). This petitioner cannot do upon the
record.
Although he has not served and filed an application to
produce additional evidence pursuant to rule 23 (b) of the
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Rules on Appeal, petitioner asserts (citing Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 956a) that he could produce evidence relating to his mental condition after the rendition of the superior court judgment in this proceeding which would establish good reason to
believe that he is insane. Affidavits of petitioner's counsel
and a psychiatrist have been presented by petitioner and
reports of prison doctors and psychiatrists have been presented
by the attorney general. [6] Examination of those documents, which concern petitioner's mental condition and the
treatment thereof since the rendition of the judgment denying mandate, shows that the additional evidence, if formally
produced, would be, as was the evidence before the trial court,
in conflict. This case is before us on appellate review, not
as a matter of original jurisdiction. Hence, it would be inappropriate for this court to undertake to resolve the conflict. [7] It was not intended by enactment of section
956a ''that the reviewing courts should develop generally into
trial courts." (Tupman v. Haberkern (1929), 208 Cal. 256,
269 [280 P. 970].)
Petitioner asserts that he is denied due process of law if
he is not accorded judicial review of the question whether
there is good reason to believe that he has become insane.
It has been held that federal due process accords him no such
right. (Solesbee v. Balkcom (1950), 339 U.S. 9, 12 [70 S.Ct.
457, 94 L.Ed. 604] .) Nevertheless, in this proceeding it has
been accorded him.
[8] Inasmuch as the circumstances of this case have
brought the entire cause before us, and inasmuch as the
record, as above noted, indicates an erroneous view by the
trial judge of the duty of the warden in the premises and
does not contain a finding expressly resolving the controlling
issue, it appears proper to deny the motion to dismiss the
appeal. However, after consideration of the entire record,
we are satisfied that petitioner has not been prejudiced by
the errors noted.
For the reasons above stated, the motion to dismiss the
appeal is denied. Likewise for reasons above stated, the
judgment appealed from is affirmed. The stay of execution
heretofore granted is terminated.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and Edmonds, J., concurred.
TRAYNOR, J .. Dissenting.-Humanitarian considerations
have led the Legislature to extend to persons under judgment
of death the privilege of avoiding punishment while insane.
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(Pen. Code, § 1367.) The warden of the state prison is
charged with the responsibility of determining whether there
is good reason to believe that a person under judgment of
death has become insane. (Pen. Code, § 3701.) Mandamus
cannot properly issue to compel the warden to institute proceedings under section 3701, since the courts are prohibited
from suspending the execution of a judgment of death (Pen.
Code, § 3700), and are without power, except as provided
by statute, to determine the sanity of a person sentenced to
death and in the custody of the warden. (In re Phyle, 30
Cal.2d 838, 846 [186 P.2d 134] ; see People v. Sloper, 198
Cal. 601, 608 [246 P. 802].) A person under judgment of
death does not have a constitutional right to have execution
of sentence suspended on the ground that he has become
insane. (People v. Riley, 37 Cal.2d 510, 514 [235 P.2d 381] ;
Phyle v. Duffy, 34 Cal.2d 144, 157 [208 P.2d 668], concurring
opinion.) Procedural due process does not prevent delegation of the duty of determining the sanity of a person under
judgment of death to au administrative official and does not
require judicial review of that official's determination. (Solesbee v. Balkom, 339 U.S. 9, 12-13 [70 S.Ct. 457, 94 L.Ed. 604] ;
Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U.S. 398, 405-409 [18 S.Ct. 87, 42 L.Ed.
515] ; In re Phyle, supra, 30 Cal.2d at 847-850; Phyle v.
Duffy, supra, 34 Cal.2d at 159-161.)
Since the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the proceeding, I would reverse the judgment and direct the trial
court to dismiss the proceeding. (In re McGee, 36 Cal.2d
592, 599 [226 P.2d 1] .)
Spence, J., concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
Since I am :firmly of the opnuon that mandamus is not
available to determine the sanity of a person under sentence
of death and that habeas corpus is the only remedy available
to such a person, I would reverse the judgment with directions
to the trial court to dismiss the proceeding. As a basis for this
conclusion I adopt the reasoning and the views expressed by
Mr. Justice Schauer in his concurring and dissenting opinion
in Phyle v. Duffy, 34 Cal.2d 144, page 163 et seq. [208
P.2d 668], in which I concurred.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied December
3, 1953. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition should
be granted.

